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THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE AND THE
EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE FACE OF NEW
TECHNOLOGY: A BROAD OR NARROW
EXCEPTION?
Adam A. Bereston+
Justice Sotomayor asserted that technology “may ‘alter the relationship
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic
society.’”1 In only the past several decades, technological advancement has had
an immense impact on how our society functions. The emergence of the
Internet, the smartphone, and the Global Positioning System (GPS) has changed
the way we do business, communicate with each other, store and transmit
information, and navigate the world.2 The widespread use of technology has
ushered in a new digital era, one that presents challenging new legal questions.3
As a result, courts have re-examined our individual rights and redefined the
scope of Constitutional protections arising out of police conduct.4 The breadth
of this scope is the primary focus of this Comment.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution establishes that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
+
J.D. Candidate, 2017, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. I would
like to thank Amanda Azarian and my parents, Kathy and David, for their love and encouragement.
I would especially like to thank Daniel Zachem for his guidance, without which this Comment
would not be possible.
1. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting
United States v. Cuevas–Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
2. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (describing the pervasiveness of cell
phones in American society).
3. See id. at 2485 (applying a different legal analysis when cell phone data is being searched
rather than a physical item); see also Adam Lamparello & Charles E. MacLean, Riley v. California:
Privacy Still Matters, but How Much and in What Contexts?, 27 REGENT U. L. REV. 25, 34 (2015)
[T]echnology cuts both ways. It gives individuals the ability to store a virtual treasure
trove of information, much of it traditionally considered private under the Fourth
Amendment, in an object no larger than the size of their hands. Technology, however,
has also become an ‘important tool[] in facilitating coordination and communication
among members of criminal enterprises.’
Id. (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493) (internal alterations omitted).
4. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485; Adam Charles Maas, Instasearch: Fixing Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence as Applied to Instagram and Other Cyberspace Data Storage Providers,
16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 202, 220 (2015) (“[T]he courts not only must define privacy expectations
for various technologies, but they must also re-evaluate those decisions every decade or so to
determine whether or not reasonable expectations have changed.”).
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violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.5
The first step in a Fourth Amendment analysis requires determining whether
or not the Fourth Amendment is even implicated.6 In other words, has a “search”
occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment? The method for
answering this question has changed over time, evolving from a common-law
trespass theory to an approach that also focuses on the individual.7
Recently, courts have struggled to consistently determine when and how the
Fourth Amendment applies to police searches of items that have already been
searched by a private party.8 The answer to this question is governed by the
“private search” doctrine, which states that when a private (i.e., nongovernmental) party searches an item prior to the government’s search of that
same item, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated, so long as the government
does not exceed the scope of the private search.9

5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. See, e.g., Ruhren v. Spittal, No. 1:15cv445 (AJT/JFA), 2015 WL 11112157, at *3 (E.D.
Va. May 14, 2015); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113–16 (1984) (discussing
the requirement of government action to constitute a “search” and “seizure” under the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment).
7. See infra Section I.A.
8. See United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1347 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying the “private
search” doctrine, but finding that defendants did not have standing to contest a warrantless search
because they had abandoned their cell phone); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 480
(6th Cir. 2015) (applying the private search doctrine and finding an officer’s search of a defendant’s
laptop computer to be unreasonable because the officer lacked “virtual certainty” regarding what
he was going to see on the computer when he conducted the search); Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d
832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying the private search doctrine and finding no Fourth Amendment
violation because the police were “substantially certain” their search of a defendant’s digital media
devices would uncover child pornography after those devices had been previously viewed by the
defendant’s wife and daughter); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2001)
(lamenting the lack of Supreme Court guidance regarding the scope of the private search doctrine
and concluding that the police conduct in the case had violated the Fourth Amendment).
9. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117. The Supreme Court has stated,
[i]t is well-settled that when an individual reveals private information to another, he
assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if
that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that
information. Once frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now nonprivate information.
Id. A significant justification for the private search exception to the exclusionary rule is the
expected non-deterrence of private searchers. While an officer would presumably refrain from
conducting an illegal search because he knows any evidence he uncovers will eventually be
excluded at trial, this same knowledge “purportedly has little effect on a private individual[] ‘who
is often motivated by reasons independent of a desire to secure criminal conviction and who seldom
engages in searches upon a sufficiently regular basis to be affected by the exclusionary sanction.’”
Monica R. Shah, Note, The Case for a Statutory Suppression Remedy to Regulate Illegal Private
Party Searches in Cyberspace, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 250, 254–55 (2005) (quoting WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.8(b), at 219–20
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However, computers and other modern technological devices present a unique
problem when applying the doctrine, given the sheer volume of information that
these devices are capable of storing.10 Several federal circuit courts have sought
to address this issue, but their differing opinions have arguably created more
uncertainty. These circuits are split over the scope of a permissible search, or in
other words, how much of a device may be searched by the government after a
search by a private party.11 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits held that when a
private party has searched only part of the entire device, the government may
then search the entire device without implicating the Fourth Amendment.12 On
the other hand, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits held that the government search
is limited only to those individual files that were searched by the private party,
and that anything exceeding the private search is unconstitutional absent a
warrant.13
Given the lack of clarity for law enforcement regarding acceptable searches
of computers, and for the public regarding the scope of their constitutional
protections under the Fourth Amendment,14 the Supreme Court should weigh in
to resolve the circuit split. If it does, the Court should adopt the approach taken
by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, which would allow police to search the entire
computer after a private party searches one or more individual files.15
Part I of this Comment introduces the Fourth Amendment as informed by its
history and meaning at common law. It then traces the development of the
Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine from an approach that focused primarily
on an individual’s property rights to one that is more concerned with an
individual’s personal rights. This Comment then briefly examines the privacy
rights that are protected under the Fourth Amendment and the challenges that
modern technology presents for those rights. Next, this Comment introduces the
private search doctrine, examines how it applies to searches of physical items,
(3d ed. 1996)). Accordingly, when evidence is discovered as a result of a private party’s search,
the typically powerful deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule is not invoked. Furthermore,
alternative remedies against the illegal private party searcher make exclusion of the evidence less
necessary. Id.
10. See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488; see also Priscilla Grantham Adams, Fourth
Amendment Applicability: Private Searches, Univ. of Miss. Sch. of Law, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUSTICE
& THE RULE OF LAW 8 (2008), http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/PrivateSearchDoctrine.pdf
(“Whereas the analysis of a case in which the Government searches a shoe box following a private
search of the same one would have no problem classifying the Government’s search as mere
replication, it becomes less clear when the object searched is a computer.”).
11. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
12. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465 (“[P]olice do not exceed the scope of a prior private search when
they examine particular items within a container that were not examined by the private searchers”);
Rann, 689 F.3d at 836–37 (adopting the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Runyan).
13. Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336 (ruling that an officer’s warrantless search of a video
“exceeded—not replicated—the breadth of the private search”); Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488
(concluding that an officer’s search must “stay within the scope of [the] initial private search”).
14. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
15. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 465; Rann, 689 F.3d at 837.
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and reviews the analysis used by courts to identify whether a police search
violated the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, this Comment describes the
circuit split that exists between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, which adopt the
broad view, and the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, which adopt the narrow view.
Part II of this Comment analyzes the different results that are produced by each
approach. Next, it discusses a problem that arises when the private party acts
under direction of a government agent to conduct a subsequent search. In Part
III, this Comment argues that, should the Supreme Court be faced with resolving
this circuit split, it should adopt the broad view because it is more in line with
the underlying principles of the private search doctrine and the Fourth
Amendment.
I. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVATE
SEARCH DOCTRINE
A. The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment is best understood through the lens of its propertybased common-law origin.16 The Framers of the Bill of Rights were likely
influenced by Entick v. Carrington,17 a 1765 English decision in which the court
emphasized that any invasion on private property is a trespass that must be
justified in law—typically, a government-issued warrant provides such a
justification. 18 Consequently, Entick informed the Supreme Court’s initial
approach to addressing Fourth Amendment issues, 19 which asked whether a

16. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“The text of the Fourth Amendment
reflects its close connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to ‘the right
of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures’; the phrase ‘in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects’ would have been superfluous.”).
17. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). This decision has been referred to
as “a monument of English freedom undoubtedly familiar to every American statesman at the time
the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be the true and ultimate expression of
constitutional law” with regard to search and seizure. Jones, 565 U.S. at 405.
18. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817; see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (“[I]t is
. . . incumbent upon the defendants to show the law by which this seizure is warranted. If that cannot
be done, it is a trespass.”).
19. The Supreme Court resurrected the Entick doctrine in the Boyd decision, reasoning,
[t]he principles laid down in [Entick] affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and
security. They reach further than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with
its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; see Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the ‘Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’:
An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1083 (1987) (“Entick delineated the
fundamental analysis that, even today, influences the outcome of a challenge to governmental
authority to conduct a search: the essential inquiry balances public necessity with individual
rights.”); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004) (noting that modern Fourth
Amendment doctrine is largely predicated on property law principles).
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physical intrusion on private property “would have been considered a ‘search’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”20
The Court consistently applied this approach until the 1960s, when the Warren
Court shifted the analysis from a primarily property-based approach to one
which emphasized the protection of individual rights. 21 This shift was in
response to technological advancements, which presented situations that could
not possibly have existed at the time the Fourth Amendment was drafted. In
Katz v. United States,22 Charles Katz argued that a public telephone booth was
a constitutionally protected area, and thus, that the evidence obtained by
attaching a recording device to the exterior of the booth was an invasion of
privacy. 23 Moreover, Katz asserted that there did not need to be physical
penetration into a constitutionally protected area to constitute a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.24 Although the Court ultimately ruled in
Katz’s favor, it rejected the narrow focus on “constitutionally protected areas”
and the “right to privacy” as central concerns under the Fourth Amendment
analysis, stating instead that the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment
extend much further.25
Accordingly, in Katz, the requirement that the Fourth Amendment is only
implicated when there is physical penetration by the government fell out of favor
with the Court.26 Instead, the Court added to this traditional common-law focus

20. Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (“Consistent with [Entick] . . . , Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”).
21. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
people not places.”); see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) (discussing the evolution of common law protections of person and
property); Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away:
The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 933, 985–91 (2010) (discussing the evolution of the Fourth Amendment during the
Warren era of the Supreme Court); Richard S. Julie, High-Tech Surveillance Tools and the Fourth
Amendment: Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Technological Age, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
127, 129–30 (2000) (describing the shift from the trespass-based theory to a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test). For a discussion on privacy and property theory under the Fourth
Amendment, see David Steinberg, Florida v. Jardines: Privacy, Trespass, and the Fourth
Amendment, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 91, 97–101 (2013).
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. Id. at 349.
24. Id. at 349–50.
25. Id. at 350–51.
[The Fourth] Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of
governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with
privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other
forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a person’s general right to
privacy—his right to be let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property
and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.
Id.
26. See id. at 352–53.
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on property by suggesting that what a person seeks to preserve as private may
also be constitutionally protected, even in an area that is accessible to the
public. 27 Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, fashioned a two-part test to
determine whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
searched by the government.28 The test, which was subsequently adopted and
applied by the Court in future cases, first asks whether the person exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, whether the expectation
of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.29 In effect,
the Court expanded the reach of Fourth Amendment protection, while still
maintaining the warrant requirement.30
The conclusions reached by both the majority and Justice Harlan in Katz
exemplified the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in response to
technological advancement. As new technology became available and the
government began to use that technology to intrude into traditionally protected
areas, the Court was forced to reconsider the parameters of a search under the
Fourth Amendment and expand its Fourth Amendment analysis.31
The Court reached a similar result in the 2001 case of Kyllo v. United States.32
In Kyllo, police officers used a thermal imager from the outside of the
petitioner’s home to detect radiation that the officers suspected was emanating
from heat lamps used to grow marijuana inside the home.33 In deciding this
case, the Court acknowledged the relatively cloudy precedent governing the
It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further
Fourth Amendment inquiry, for that Amendment was thought to limit only searches and
seizures of tangible property. But the premise that property interests control the right of
the Government to search and seize has been discredited. Thus . . . we have since departed
from [this] narrow view. . . . We conclude that the underpinnings of [the cases invoking
the “trespass” doctrine”] have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the
“trespass” doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.
Id. (internal citations and alterations omitted).
27. Id. at 351.
28. Id. at 361.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 357 (“[T]he mandate of the Fourth Amendment requires adherence to judicial
processes, and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”) (internal citations and alterations
omitted).
31. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (finding that the advance of
technology has the power to “shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”).
32. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Katz involved eavesdropping by means of an electronic listening device placed on the
outside of a telephone booth—a location not within the catalog (‘persons, houses, papers,
and effects’) that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches. We held
that the Fourth Amendment nonetheless protected Katz from the warrantless
eavesdropping because he ‘justifiably relied’ upon the privacy of the telephone booth.
Id. at 32–33 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).
33. Id. at 29–30.
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issue of whether the use of this technology violated the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable search and seizure. 34 Under the traditional
common law trespassory approach, visual surveillance of the outside of a home
would not be a search implicating the Fourth Amendment.35 However, in order
to uphold the principles of Fourth Amendment protections as they existed at the
time of adoption, the Court held that the use of thermal imagery constituted a
search even though there was no physical intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area.36 Extending the reasoning in Katz, the Court concluded that there
is a minimal expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. 37 Importantly, the Court observed, “[t]o withdraw
protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to
erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”38
These cases illustrate the Court’s willingness, and perhaps, the need, to
expand the reach of Fourth Amendment protection to answer the constitutional
questions posed by the advent of new technology.
B. The Fourth Amendment and Privacy
1. United States v. Jones
After years of addressing the minimum level of privacy under the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Court eventually returned its focus to
the common law roots of the Fourth Amendment.39 In the 2012 case United
States v. Jones,40 the Court considered whether the placement of a GPS tracking
device on a defendant’s vehicle constituted a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment at the time it was adopted.41 But instead of asking whether
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle’s
movements on the open road,42 the Court simply found that the government’s
installation of the GPS tracker constituted a physical intrusion upon the
34. Id. at 31 (“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is
reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no. On the other hand, the antecedent
question whether or not a Fourth Amendment “search” has occurred is not so simple under our
precedent.”) (internal citations omitted).
35. Id.; see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (“[T]he eye cannot . . . be guilty
of trespass.”); see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36 (1942); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–66 (1928) (holding that auditory intercepts of communication did not
implicate the Fourth Amendment because no physical trespass occurred).
36. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35.
37. Id. at 34.
38. Id.
39. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (declining to apply the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test and reviving the trespass-based approach to Fourth
Amendment search questions).
40. 565 U.S. 400.
41. Id. at 402.
42. Id. at 406.
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defendant’s property, and thus, the government’s conduct was an
unconstitutional search.43 To support its conclusion, the Court reasoned that the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test was merely “added to, not substituted
for, the common-law trespassory test.”44 In other words, it found that a Fourth
Amendment search can occur when the government physically intrudes upon a
constitutionally protected interest with the object of securing evidence, even if a
defendant would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that interest.45
Despite the Court’s groundbreaking revival of the trespass doctrine in Jones, the
Court was not finished there, as the advent of new technology forced the Court
to refine its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence even further.
2. Riley v. California
In Riley v. California,46 the Court dealt with a challenge to the admissibility
of evidence obtained through a warrantless search of a defendant’s cell phone.47
Concerned about the volume and intrusive nature of information available on
cell phones,48 the Court reasoned that “[m]odern cell phones, as a category,
implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of
[physical items like] a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”49 When considering
whether an exception to the warrant requirement applied, the Court discussed a
balancing test in which it considers “the degree to which [the search] intrudes
upon an individual’s privacy, and . . . the degree to which it is needed to promote
a legitimate government interest.”50 The Court analyzed the various assertions
by the government regarding the scope of a warrantless search of a cell phone,
observing the key differences between a cell phone and ordinary physical

43. Id. at 404–05.
44. Id. at 409; see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]hough Katz may add to
the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amendment’s protections ‘when the
Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area.’”).
45. 565 U.S. at 407–08. On occasion, the Court has found that certain areas are not
constitutionally protected, and thus, that government intrusion into those areas would not constitute
a search. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (finding that the “curtilage” of a home is a constitutionally
protected area); but see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180–81 (1984) (finding that open
fields, or the land not immediately surrounding a home, are not constitutionally protected).
46. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
47. Id. at 2481.
48. Id. at 2478 (“[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and qualitative sense from other
items that might be carried on an arrestee’s person . . . cell phones can store millions of pages of
text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.”); see also id. at 2488 (“The United States asserts
that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is ‘materially indistinguishable’ from searches of
these sorts of physical items. That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable
from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies
lumping them together.”).
49. Id. at 2488–89.
50. Id. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
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items.51 The Court, however, declined to extend an exception to the warrant
requirement to cell phones as it has done to ordinary physical items because cell
phones “differ in both a quantitative and qualitative sense” such that the privacy
intrusion outweighs the promotion of government interests.52
The Riley decision sheds light on how the Court is likely to interpret the Fourth
Amendment in future cases involving warrantless searches of digital
information. 53 As cell phones contain “the privacies of life,” and given the
Court’s willingness to allow warrantless searches of cell phones only under
exigent circumstances and on a case-by-case basis, it is reasonable to predict that
the scope of a warrantless search of a digital device will be interpreted
narrowly.54 However, it is worth observing that the Court analyzed the issue of
police searches of cell phones in the context of a search incident to arrest only.55
Thus, it is unclear whether the Court would retreat from this position when the
cell phone search occurs in a different context by a private party.
C. The Private Search Doctrine
The principal question that follows from this discussion is: what about when
the information has been previously disclosed to a third party? In United States
v. Jacobsen, the Court answered this by devising the private search doctrine,
which holds that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when the government
subsequently searches an item that was previously searched by a private party.56
The caveat to this doctrine is that the government may not exceed the scope of
the search conducted by the private party without implicating the Fourth
Amendment.57 The reach of this scope, however, is the subject of a current
circuit split.
The two approaches taken by the circuits are referred to as the “broad
approach” and the “narrow approach.” The broad approach, as adopted by the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits, states that when a party searches any part of a single
51. Id. at 2489. (“The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices
are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone”).
52. Id. at 2493.
53. See id. at 2495.
The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand
does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders
fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone
seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.
Id.
54. See id.; see also Mark Wilson, Preparing for Another Computer Search Case at SCOTUS,
FINDLAW (May 26, 2015, 12:01 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2015/05/ (“Thanks to
Riley, all of our old case law about searching physical containers is shifting in the circuit courts of
appeal when it comes to computers.”).
55. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
56. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115–17 (1984); United States v.
Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 481–83 (6th Cir. 2015).
57. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115–17.
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unit, the privacy interests in the entire unit are frustrated, and thus, the unit may
be searched in its entirety without implicating the Fourth Amendment.58 The
narrow approach, as adopted by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, states that when
a party searches a part of the unit, only the privacy interests in those items
viewed by the private party are frustrated, and the scope of any subsequent
warrantless search must be limited accordingly.59
To understand how the Court applies the private search doctrine, it is helpful
to first examine cases involving other physical items not including data files or
technology. In the 1998 Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. Paige,60 the
court sought to answer the question of whether a private-party search of an attic
was sufficient to render a subsequent warrantless police search of that attic valid
under the Fourth Amendment.61 In Paige, marijuana was discovered in the attic
while home improvement contractors were repairing a roof.62 The Paige court
applied a two-part test to determine whether the search by the private party—the
contractors in this case—implicated the Fourth Amendment. 63 The test was
whether “the government knew of or acquiesced in the intrusive conduct of [the
contractors], and [whether the contractors] intended to assist law enforcement
efforts in conducting their search,” therefore implicating the Fourth
Amendment.64 Having found that the search by the contractors did not implicate
the Fourth Amendment, the court turned to the question of whether the
subsequent search by the police officer implicated the Fourth Amendment by
exceeding the scope of the original search by the contractors.65
To make this determination, the court considered whether the initial intrusion
by the private party was reasonably foreseeable.66 If so, and the subsequent
police intrusion did not exceed the scope of the intrusion by the private party,
the Fourth Amendment would not be implicated. 67 However, if the private
intrusion was not reasonably foreseeable, the subsequent police intrusion would

58. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 463–65 (5th Cir. 2001); Rann v. Atchison, 689
F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2012); see also, United States v. Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226, 1238–39 (11th Cir.
2015) (finding that once a private party searches an object, the government does not violate the
Fourth Amendment by replicating the same search); United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1020
(5th Cir. 1998) (finding that once a private party infringes upon a person’s expectation of privacy,
no search occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if a police officer searches that
same area).
59. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015); Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d
at 489.
60. 136 F.3d 1012 (5th Cir. 1998).
61. Id. at 1014.
62. Id. at 1015–16.
63. Id. at 1017.
64. Id. at 1017–18.
65. Id. at 1018–19.
66. Id. at 1020.
67. Id.
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implicate the Fourth Amendment.68
The court found that the intrusion into the attic by home improvement
contractors while repairing a roof was reasonably foreseeable and held that the
subsequent police intrusion was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.69 The appellant no longer possessed a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the area searched by police because the privacy interest had already
been frustrated by the initial private-party search.70
Similarly, in the Fifth Circuit case United States v. Oliver,71 police obtained a
cardboard box that contained documents, credit cards, and a laptop, belonging
to the defendant, that was first searched by the defendant’s girlfriend before
turning it over to police.72 The police subsequently searched the contents of the
box within the scope of the prior search by the defendant’s girlfriend.73 Relying
on Paige, the court held that it was reasonably foreseeable for the defendant’s
girlfriend to search the box, and thus, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated
by the subsequent police search. 74 Moreover, the court held that the
government’s search of the contents of a notebook in the box did not implicate
the Fourth Amendment, even though the defendant’s girlfriend had not
previously performed such a search.75 The court stated that the contents of the
notebook were obvious and therefore did not exceed the scope of the privateparty search because both the front cover and a loose piece of paper protruding
from the notebook revealed information regarding the defendant’s illegal
activity.76
In the Eleventh Circuit case of United States v. Odoni,77 the co-defendants
were convicted for their involvement in two investment-fraud schemes.78 Upon

68. Id.
69. Id. at 1021 (“In the instant case, both Paige’s conduct and the circumstances of the
situation created a risk of intrusion into his garage’s attic that was reasonably foreseeable. . . .
Accidents of this type, related to the task at hand and arising contemporaneously therewith, are
reasonably expected to occur.”).
70. Id. This, however, does not end the inquiry. Although there was no longer an expectation
of privacy in the marijuana, the defendant still maintained a possessory interest. As such, the
subsequent seizure of the marijuana had to be justified by a warrant or exception. In Paige, the
court held that the warrantless seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine and thus, upheld
the appellant’s conviction. Id. at 1023–24.
71. 630 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2011).
72. Id. at 402–03.
73. Id. at 403. At the time, the police were unaware of the prior private search. Id. The court
rejected the significance of this point, stating “it is the private search itself, and not the authorities’
learning of such search, that renders a police officer’s subsequent warrantless search permissible.”
Id. at 407.
74. Id. at 407.
75. Id. at 408.
76. Id.
77. 782 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015).
78. Id. at 1229.
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his arrest at a London airport, co-defendant Paul Gunter’s two mobile phones,
laptop computer, and thumb drive were seized, among other things.79
After being copied by an IT Forensic Investigator, these items were first
turned over to the City of London Police, before making their way into the hands
of U.S. officials.80 The data files were then reviewed without a search warrant.81
Gunter moved to suppress evidence from the seized items, arguing that “the
Fourth Amendment required the U.S. agents to obtain a warrant before searching
his electronic data files, even if the files were lawfully seized in the United
Kingdom and provided to U.S. officials by British authorities.”82
The court first asked whether Gunter had an “objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data files when U.S. agents examined them.”83
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobsen, the court noted that a person
no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy after a third party has searched
the object.84 Relying on this reasoning, the court opined that Gunter did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his data files as the U.S. agents that
searched them did not learn anything that had not previously been learned
through the search by the British officials.85 It is also important to note that there
was no evidence in the record that the search by the British authorities was
conducted under the direction of U.S. officials.86

79. Id. at 1236.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1237.
83. Id. at 1238. The court analyzed the search and seizure separately, recognizing that they
“implicate two distinct interests.” See id. at 1237–38 (differentiating the privacy interest implicated
by the search from the possessory interest implicated by the seizure and explaining that a court
“must analyze the search and the seizure separately, keeping in mind that the fact that police have
lawfully come into possession of an item does not necessarily mean they are entitled to search that
item without a warrant”).
84. Id. at 1238 (reasoning that foreign government agents are akin to private parties under the
private search doctrine).
85. Id. The court identified a distinction between the case at hand and Jacobsen. Specifically,
in Jacobsen, the previous search was conducted by a private party, rather than a foreign official.
However, the court concluded that the reasoning in Jacobsen applied in both instances, explaining
that “the Fourth Amendment generally does not apply to the actions of foreign officials enforcing
foreign law in a foreign country,” and the key to the private search analysis is whether an otherwise
reasonable expectation of privacy has been extinguished by a prior search. Id. at 1238–39.
Although the third party who conducted the prior search in Jacobsen was a private actor,
the reasoning in Jacobsen applies with equal force when the third party who conducts
the prior search is a foreign governmental official. . . . [I]n both cases, an entity other
than a U.S. state or federal agent or official has already examined the object and its
contents and therefore eliminated the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents.
Id. at 1238–39.
86. See id. at 1238–39. Had the U.S. officials directed the action of British authorities, the
Fourth Amendment may have been implicated under an agency theory. See infra Section II.B.
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D. Circuit Courts Split Over the Application of the Private Search Doctrine to
Technology
1. Broad View
In United States v. Runyan, the Fifth Circuit adopted the broad approach when
it applied the private search doctrine to data files.87 In Runyan, while searching
through the defendant’s property to find her belongings, the defendant’s ex-wife
stumbled upon a black duffel bag that contained pornography, compact and
computer disks, a camera with film, and Polaroid pictures, among other things.88
Another search revealed a desktop computer, floppy disks, compact disks, and
several ZIP drives.89 The defendant’s ex-wife opened about twenty compact
disks and floppy disks, but did not view anything on the ZIP drives.90 After
determining that they contained child pornography, the ex-wife turned over
many of these items to the police.91 Officers subsequently examined several of
the images stored on the containers they were given, including images from the
ZIP disks that had not been previously viewed by the ex-wife.92
After being convicted of several child pornography-related charges, the
defendant appealed, arguing that the pre-warrant evidence viewed by the police
should have been suppressed because the police had exceeded the scope of the
prior private-party search.93 Determining that the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the evidence at issue,94 a panel of Fifth Circuit judges
held that a “search” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment does not occur
when police view an item that was previously searched by a private party, so
long as the police do not exceed the scope of the private search.95
Thus, the essential questions in this case were twofold: whether the police
exceeded the scope of the prior private-party search by the ex-wife (1) when
they examined previously unsearched disks; and (2) when they examined more
images on the individual disks than the private party.96 The court acknowledged

87. 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001).
88. Id. at 453.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 454.
93. Id. at 455, 460.
94. See id. at 458. The court noted the following factors as being dispositive: “whether
Runyan had a possessory interest in the personal property searched, whether he exhibited a
subjective expectation of privacy in that personal property, and whether he took normal precautions
to maintain that expectation of privacy.” Id.
95. Id. (“[A] police view subsequent to a search conducted by private citizens does not
constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment so long as the view is confined
to the scope and product of the initial search.”) (quoting United States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173,
175 (5th Cir. 1978)).
96. Id. at 460.
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that under Jacobsen, the proper inquiry was “whether the government learned
something from the police search that it could not have learned from the private
searcher’s testimony and, if so, whether the defendant had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in that information.”97 However, the court recognized
that there was not much existing precedent available to determine how the
inquiry applies when determining whether a police search exceeds the scope of
a private-party search.98
Regarding the first question, the court determined that where a private party
has previously opened some containers but not others, the government’s search
of an unopened container would exceed the scope of the private search, unless
the government searcher was virtually, or “substantially,” certain of what she
would find inside.99 The “virtual certainty” requirement is met when a police
officer has a degree of certainty equivalent to seeing the contraband in “plain
view.” 100 In other words, if a container’s outward appearance leads an officer
to infer that contraband is contained therein with such certainty that it is as if the
contraband is essentially out in the open (i.e., in plain view), the officer may
search the container without a warrant.101 The court determined that this rule
best captured the doctrine laid out by the Supreme Court in Jacobsen.102 As
such, the warrantless police search of the disks not viewed by the ex-wife
exceeded the allowable scope and the evidence obtained from those disks should
have been suppressed.103
Regarding the second question, the court stated that a person’s privacy interest
in a particular container is frustrated if it is opened and examined by private
searchers.104 As such, the court concluded, “police do not exceed the private
Today, we address only . . . narrow questions: (1) whether a police search exceeds the
scope of a private search when private searchers examine selected items from a collection
of similar closed containers and police searchers subsequently examine the entire
collection; [and] (2) whether a police search exceeds the scope of the private search when
the police examine more items within a particular container than did the private searchers
....
Id. at 461–62.
97. Id. at 460 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118–20 (1984)).
98. Id. at 461 (“[I]t is unclear from this court’s jurisprudence which of [the distinctions
between the private search and the police search] are constitutionally relevant.”).
99. Id. at 463.
100. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 750–51 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
101. Id.
102. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463.
103. Id. at 464.
104. Id.
Though the Supreme Court has long recognized that individuals have an expectation of
privacy in closed containers, an individual’s expectation of privacy in the contents of a
container has already been compromised if that container was opened and examined by
private searchers. Thus, the police do not engage in a new ‘search’ for Fourth
Amendment purposes each time they examine a particular item found within the
container.
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search when they examine more items within a closed container than did the
private searchers.” 105 In other words, the fact that officers examined more
images on the disks than the private searchers was not enough to warrant
suppression of those images.
The Seventh Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit’s approach in the case of Rann
v. Atchison. 106 In Rann, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault and
possession of child pornography.107 On appeal, the defendant asserted that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney did not seek to
suppress evidence obtained from a ZIP drive and camera memory card.108
The defendant’s biological daughter provided police with the memory card
from the camera that the defendant had used to photograph her.109 Her mother
turned over a computer ZIP drive. 110
Both items contained child
pornography. 111 The defendant argued that the police officers exceeded the
scope of the private search because there was no evidence that either the victim
or her mother knew that the items contained images of child pornography before
the police viewed them.112 Thus, the government’s action violated the Fourth
Amendment.113
Reiterating the inquiry laid out in Jacobsen and recited in Runyan, the court
reasoned that “individuals retain a legitimate expectation of privacy even after a
private individual conducts a search, and ‘additional invasions of privacy by the
government agent must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope
of the private search.’”114 The court specifically cited to Runyan, explaining that
“a search of any material on a computer disk is valid if the private party who
conducted the initial search had viewed at least one file on the disk.”115
The Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning in Runyan after finding it
persuasive.116 Accordingly, the court determined that the police search of the
Id. at 464–65 (internal citations omitted).
105. Id. at 464.
106. 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012).
107. Id. at 833.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 834.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 836.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984)).
115. Id. (citing United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001)).
116. Id. at 837.
We find that Runyan’s holding strikes the proper balance between the legitimate
expectation of privacy an individual retains in the contents of his digital media storage
devices after a private search has been conducted and the “additional invasions of privacy
by the government agent” that “must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the
scope of the private search.”
Id. (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115).

460

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 66:445

data files did not exceed the scope of the private search.117 Moreover, the court
relied on the lower court’s factual finding that it was likely that the mother had
compiled the images onto the disk herself after downloading them from the
family computer and therefore was aware of the content of the digital files turned
over to police.118
Even if the police had searched the data files more thoroughly than the private
searchers, the search was still permissible under the Runyan rationale because
the mother and victim knew what the memory card and ZIP disk contained when
they turned them over to the police, and, therefore, the police could be
substantially certain that they contained child pornography.119 As a result, the
search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.120
2. Narrow View
The Sixth Circuit adopted a different approach in United States v.
Lichtenberger.121 In that case, the defendant was arrested for failing to register
as a sex offender.122 Following his arrest, the defendant’s girlfriend hacked into
his password-protected computer, as she was suspicious of the fact that the
defendant would never let her use his computer.123 After gaining access, she
began opening folders until she eventually found several images of child
pornography.124 She contacted police who then came to her house and asked her
to show the officer the images she had found. 125 The defendant’s girlfriend
clicked on random thumbnail images.126 After identifying the images as child
pornography, the officer seized the laptop and several other items belonging to
the defendant.127 At trial, the girlfriend testified that she was unsure whether the
pictures she showed the officer were the same pictures she had previously
opened.128
In considering whether the officer’s warrantless search was permissible, the
court noted that “the government’s ability to conduct a warrantless follow-up
117. Id. at 837–38.
118. See id. (“These findings were reasonable based on the trial testimony. S.R. testified that
she knew Rann had taken pornographic pictures of her . . . . Both women brought evidence
supporting S.R.’s allegations to the police; it is entirely reasonable to conclude that they knew that
the digital media devices contained that evidence.”). Id. at 838.
119. Id. at 838 (citing Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463).
120. Id.
121. 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015).
122. Id. at 479.
123. Id. at 479–80.
124. Id. The defendant’s girlfriend testified that “she viewed approximately 100 images of
child pornography saved in several subfolders.” Id. at 481. The police officer, however, viewed
only four to five photographs during the subsequent warrantless search. Id.
125. Id. at 480.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 481.
128. Id.
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search . . . is expressly limited by the scope of the initial private search.”129 Most
importantly, the court focused on the fact that in Jacobsen, the police search did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was a “virtual certainty” that
the police officer would find what the previous private-party search revealed.130
The court explained that the proper first step is to determine the scope of the
private search, and then determine if the officer’s subsequent search exceeded
that scope.131 In ascertaining the relevant scope, it must be determined how
much information the government stands to gain and the certainty of what the
government will find.132 The court cited to Riley’s balancing test, which weighs
the intrusion upon an individual’s privacy against the promotion of legitimate
government interests to determine whether to exempt a search from the warrant
requirement. 133 However, when the item is a cell phone or another similar
electronic device, the scales seriously tip in favor of the individual’s privacy
interest because the usual justifications for a warrantless search are no longer
present,134 especially given the sheer volume of information that these devices
may carry.135
Because of the volume of information available on these devices, the court
ultimately concluded that the officer could not have been “virtually certain” that
his search of the laptop would not tell him anything more than the defendant’s
girlfriend already told him.136 The defendant’s girlfriend admitted that she could
129. Id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 116 (1984)).
130. Id. at 482–83 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118–20 (1984)).
131. Id. at 485 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984)). In holding that
the officer in this case exceeded the scope of the initial private search, the court focused on “the
extensive privacy interests at stake in a modern electronic device like a laptop and the particulars
of how [the officer] conducted his search when he arrived at the residence.” Id.
132. Id. at 485–86 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119–20 (1984)) (“Under
the private search doctrine, the critical measures of whether a governmental search exceeds the
scope of the private search that preceded it are how much information the government stands to
gain when it re-examines the evidence and, relatedly, how certain it is regarding what it will find.”).
133. Id. at 487 (“[W]e generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the
warrant requirement by assessing . . . the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
and . . . the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”)
(internal alterations removed).
134. Id. at 487.
Neither of these rationales has much force with respect to digital content on cell phones.
On the government interest side, we have previously concluded that the two risks
identified—harm to officers and destruction of evidence—are present in all custodial
arrests. There are no comparable risks when the search is of digital data. In addition, we
have regarded any privacy interests retained by an individual after arrest as significantly
diminished by the fact of the arrest itself. Cell phones, however, place vast quantities of
personal information literally in the hands of individuals. A search of the information on
a cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in
our prior cases.
Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014)).
135. Id. at 487–88; see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–91.
136. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488.
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not remember if the photographs she showed the officer were the same ones and
from the same folder that she had accessed before, and similarly, the officer
stated he may have asked her to open files that she had not previously opened.137
Accordingly, the court suppressed the evidence gathered from the subsequent
warrantless search conducted by the police.138
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Sparks, 139 similarly adopted the
narrow approach.140 In Sparks, the defendants left their cell phone containing
hundreds of images and videos of child pornography at a Walmart store.141 A
Walmart employee recovered the phone and viewed all of the pictures and one
video contained in a photo album on the phone.142 The employee then showed
the photo album to her then-fiancé, Mr. Widner, before turning it over to law
enforcement.143 Upon turning the phone over to police, Mr. Widner showed the
police the images that he and his fiancée had previously viewed.144 A police
detective subsequently viewed the pictures within the same photo album that the
employee and Mr. Widner viewed.145 Additionally, the detective viewed two
videos within the same photo album, only one of which was previously viewed
by the private parties.146 Thereafter, a police officer submitted an application
for a search warrant based on the detective’s determination that the phone
contained images of what the detective believed was child pornography.147 The
defendants were indicted for possession and production of child pornography.148
At trial, the defendants filed a motion to suppress the cell phone evidence,
arguing that the detective’s search of the cell phone exceeded the scope of the
private party search.149 The trial court denied the motion and the defendants
appealed.150
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the trial court’s ruling.151 With regard to the
photographs and the first video, the court held that the detective did not exceed
137. Id. at 488–89 (discussing the “very real possibility” that the police officer would exceed
the scope of the girlfriend’s search and pointing out that the officer “could have discovered
something else on Lichtenberger’s laptop that was private, legal, and unrelated to the allegations
prompting the search—precisely the sort of discovery the Jacobsen Court sought to avoid in
articulating its beyond-the-scope test”).
138. Id. at 491.
139. 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).
140. Id. at 1335–56.
141. Id. at 1329.
142. Id. at 1330–31.
143. Id. at 1331.
144. Id. at 1331.
145. Id. at 1331–32.
146. Id. at 1332.
147. Id. at 1332–33.
148. Id. at 1330.
149. Id. at 1333.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1335.
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the scope of the private party search even if his search was more thorough.152
However, the court found that the detective exceeded, rather than replicated, the
scope of the private party search when he viewed the second video that the
Walmart employee and Mr. Widner never viewed.153 The court raised doubts
about whether the detective’s viewing of the second video would be approved
under Riley, considering the Supreme Court’s concerns that cell phones contain
“the privacies of life” and have tremendous storage capacity that allow them to
store many different types of information.154 Therefore, the court adopted the
narrow approach, holding that “[w]hile [the] private search of the cell phone
might have removed certain information from the Fourth Amendment’s
protections, it did not expose every part of the information contained in the cell
phone.”155
Nonetheless, the court found no reversible error in the trial court’s denial of
the motion to suppress because the affidavit used to secure the search warrant
was based only on descriptions of the pictures and video previously searched by
the Walmart employee and her fiancé. 156 The affidavit did not include any
reference to the detective’s review of the second video.157
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT HAS CREATED CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY AS TO
HOW THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE SHOULD BE APPLIED IN FUTURE CASES
A. The Broad and Narrow Views Rely on the Same Rationale, but Produce
Conflicting Results
The Lichtenberger court asserted that its application of the Jacobsen private
search doctrine was in line with its sister circuits,158 and specifically cited to the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ discussion of the proper scope of a police search
under the private search doctrine.159 However, the Lichtenberger court missed
a key difference between its approach and that of the circuits to which it cited.
It is true that the relevant inquiry under Jacobsen is whether the police
obtained information in which the expectation of privacy had not already been
frustrated.160 Similar to the Sixth Circuit in Lichtenberger, the Fifth and Seventh

152. Id. at 1336.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1336–37.
157. Id. at 1336.
158. United States v. Lictenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 489 (6th Cir. 2015).
159. Id. (“We are not alone in our approach to these modern considerations under the Fourth
Amendment. Our sister circuit courts have placed a similar emphasis on virtual certainty in their
application of Jacobsen to searches of contemporary electronic devices.”).
160. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 461 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118–20 (1984)) (“Thus, Jacobsen directs courts to inquire whether the
government learned something from the police search that it could not have learned from the private
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Circuits reasoned that a police officer’s search exceeds the scope of the previous
private-party search if the officer examines the entire collection of what is turned
over, rather than limiting the search to only those items searched by the private
party.161 An exception exists when police officers can be virtually certain about
what they will find when searching an item not previously searched by the
private party. 162 Therefore, when the scope of the search includes items not
previously searched by a private party, the search is impermissible as soon as
the police learn something they could not have known based on the private
search.163
The key difference between the broad and narrow view is how the courts treat
a search by police officers of content contained within a single item, when only
some of that content has been previously searched by a private party. The
“virtual certainty” test enunciated in Lichtenberger would appear to bar such a
search, but the court in Runyan expressly permitted it.164 While Sparks did not
present the issue of police searches of additional items because it involved only
additional files within a single item, the Eleventh Circuit did not permit a search
of any files within the single item that were not previously searched by the
private party.165 Thus, while the analysis in Sparks is more limited than the other
circuit court cases, it is clear that the Sparks court sided with the court in
Lichtenberger by adopting the narrow approach.166
The court in Runyan explained that a search does not become problematic
under the Fourth Amendment when police officers search an item more
thoroughly than the private party.167 The court used a helpful analogy to closed

searcher’s testimony and, if so, whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
that information.”).
161. Id. at 465; Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 836–37 (7th Cir. 2012).
162. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 463.
Thus, under Jacobsen, confirmation of prior knowledge does not constitute exceeding
the scope of a private search. In the context of a search involving a number of closed
containers, this suggests that opening a container that was not opened by private searchers
would not necessarily be problematic if the police knew with substantial certainty, based
on the statements of the private searchers, their replication of the private search, and their
expertise, what they would find inside. Such an “expansion” of the private search
provides the police with no additional knowledge that they did not already obtain from
the underlying private search and frustrates no expectation of privacy that has not already
been frustrated.
Id.
163. Id. at 463–64 (“A defendant’s expectation of privacy with respect to a container unopened
by the private searchers is preserved unless the defendant’s expectation of privacy in the contents
of the container has already been frustrated because the contents were rendered obvious by the
private search.”).
164. See United States v. Lictenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 489 (6th Cir. 2015); Runyan, 275 F.3d
at 465.
165. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 2015).
166. See id.
167. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464.
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containers, explaining that “[i]n the context of a closed container search, this
means that the police do not exceed the private search when they examine more
items within a closed container than did the private searchers.”168 Applying this
to digital files, the Runyan court concluded that police officers do not exceed the
scope of the prior search when they examine more files on the previously
searched disks than the private parties.169
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning laid out by the court in
Runyan and held that a search does not violate the Fourth Amendment when the
police can be substantially certain as to the contents of the digital files because
the private parties who previously searched them knew their contents. 170
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit agreed that even if the police officers more
thoroughly searched the digital files, and viewed files that the private parties had
not previously viewed, they still did not exceed the scope of the prior privateparty search under Runyan.171
Thus, while the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits are all in
agreement over the impermissibility of a police search of data files where the
private party has not previously searched any of its contents, only the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits limit police searches of data files (or a container as the Fifth
Circuit analogized) to only those specific items which the private party
previously searched.172 As a result, the outcome differs depending on whether
the unit previously searched is each individual data file, as the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits require, or if the entire “container” is fair game once a part of
it has been searched, as the Fifth and Seventh Circuits make clear. 173 Each
approach can be broken down into separate definitions of “unit.” The difference
between these definitions is essential to understanding the circuit split.

168. Id. “[A]n individual’s expectation of privacy in the contents of a container has already
been compromised if that container was opened and examined by private searchers. . . . Thus,
police do not engage in a new ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes each time they examine a
particular item found within the container.” Id. at 465.
169. Id. at 465.
Because we find that the police do not exceed the scope of a prior private search when
they examine particular items within a container that were not examined by the private
searchers, we accordingly determine that the police in the instant case did not exceed the
scope of the private search if they examined more files on the privately-searched disks
than Judith and Brandie had. Suppression of any such files is therefore unnecessary.
Id.
170. Rann v. Atchinson, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012).
171. Id.
172. Compare Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465; and Rann, 689 F.3d at 838; with United States v.
Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015); and United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478,
488–89 (6th Cir. 2015).
173. Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Creates Circuit Split on Private Search Doctrine for Computers,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir
acy/wp/2015/05/20/sixth-circuit-creates-circuit-split-on-private-search-doctrine-for-computers/.
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1. The Single Unit
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits defined the unit as the entire computer. 174
Once a private party has searched even a single file or folder within that
computer, the expectation of privacy in the entire computer has been frustrated,
and the police can then search the entire computer without exceeding the scope
of the private-party search.175 This is defined as the broad view because when
the unit is the entire computer, it encompasses potentially far more information
than if the unit is defined as a single folder or file. The broad view thereby
makes all information on the computer available, rather than only information
within the single folder or file.176
2. The Single File
When the “unit” is defined as a single file, a much more narrow line is drawn
regarding what privacy interests have and have not been frustrated.177 As the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits explained, this narrow view defines the unit as being
only the file that the private party viewed.178 The police, therefore, would be
unreasonable in conducting a warrantless search of any data outside of that
individual file.179 It is easy to see how this definition of “unit” is a far more
limiting take on the private search doctrine. Under this approach, the Fourth
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy exists in each individual file.180
The information outside of this individual file unsearched by any private party
remains sheltered under the umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection. 181
Conversely, the same information would be available under the Fifth and
Seventh Circuit’s broad view once the expectation of privacy in the single file

174. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465 (analogizing the files on a disk to items within a container
for purposes of broadly defining the unit); Rann, 689 F.3d at 838 (concurring with Runyan).
175. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465; Rann, 689 F.3d at 838.
176. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
177. See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 489; Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336 (defining the unit as the
individual files opened by the private party).
178. See Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 489; Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1336.
179. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488.
[N]ot only was there no virtual certainty that [the officer’s] review was limited to the
photographs from [the private party’s] earlier search, there was a very real possibility
[the officer] exceeded the scope of [the private party’s] search and that he could have
discovered something else on Lichtenberger’s laptop that was private, legal, and
unrelated to the allegations prompting the search . . . .
Id.
180. See supra note 177 and accompanying text;
In Lichtenberger, the court seemed to suggest that folders on a computer are separate
containers for the purpose of determining the scope of the private search. In the Seventh
and Fifth circuits, however, the device—i.e., the computer—is the container, meaning
the whole file system of the computer is fair game during a search.
Wilson, supra note 54.
181. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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had been frustrated.182 Thus, whether the unit is defined as the entire physical
device or as something less (e.g., data, a file, or a folder) determines the amount
of information protected by the Fourth Amendment during a subsequent
warrantless police search.183
B. Confusion Exists over the Scope of Agency after the Initial Private-Party
Search
Another important inquiry that cannot be overlooked is whether the police
officer directed the private party to conduct the search. Upon review of the Sixth
Circuit’s analysis in Lichtenberger, it appears that the scope of this direction is
somewhat convoluted.184 The Supreme Court made clear in Jacobsen that the
protections of the Fourth Amendment do not extend to searches or seizures
“effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or
with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.”185 Therefore,
the Fourth Amendment is implicated when a private individual acts as an agent
of the government.186
In Lichtenberger, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the lower court’s inquiry into
the agency of the initial private search, saying that this inquiry is only relevant
if a government agent directed the initial private search.187 The focus, therefore,
182. Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 836–37 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Runyan, 275
F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001).
183. See Kerr, supra note 173.
184. Id.
185. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 107, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United States, 447
U.S. 649, 662 (1980)); see also Adams, supra note 10 (“A private search extinguishes an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the object searched; once this has occurred, the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of this non-private information.”).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Soderstrand, 412 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 383
(5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2003).
The Supreme Court has not clearly indicated the circumstances under which the
government is considered responsible for private conduct, offering only the vague
guideline that the result “necessarily turns on the degree of the Government’s
participation in the private party’s activities, a question that can only be resolved ‘in light
of all the circumstances.’”
Benjamin Holley, Digitizing the Fourth Amendment: Limiting the Private Search Exception in
Computer Investigations, 96 VA. L. REV. 677, 680 (2010) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–15 (1989)); see also United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 6
(1st Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1433 (9th Cir. 1990)) (“[A] party
is subject to the fourth amendment only when he or she has formed the necessary intent to assist in
the government’s investigative or administrative functions”); Joshuah Lisk, Is Batman a State
Actor?: The Dark Knight’s Relationship with the Gotham City Police Department and the Fourth
Amendment Implications, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1419, 1430 (2014) (discussing the application
of the private search doctrine to private searches conducted solely for the assistance of law
enforcement).
187. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 485 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Agency is relevant to
Holmes’ initial search because government involvement at that stage would remove the case from
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should be on the actions of the government agents, and whether they exceeded
the scope of the initial private search.188 In an earlier case, the Sixth Circuit
stated that “to trigger Fourth Amendment protection under an agency theory,
‘the police must have instigated, encouraged, or participated in the search,’ and
‘the individual must have engaged in the search with the intent of assisting the
police in their investigative efforts.’”189 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment is
implicated when an initial private search is conducted at the direction of a police
officer.
Lichtenberger asserted that the correct analysis under Jacobsen is to first
determine whether the actions of the police officer “remained within the
confines of the initial private search.” 190 However, this sheds little light on
whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated during a subsequent search when
an officer, acting within the confines of the initial private search, reveals more
information than was previously uncovered when he directs the private party to
reproduce the initial search. In other words, what happens when the private party
conducts a subsequent search with the intent of assisting police officers in their
investigative efforts, and uncovers additional information from what was
initially discovered? Under Lichtenberger, the answer is unclear.191
1. Agency Theory and the Narrow View
The agency issue demonstrates the unworkability of the narrow view.
Assume that a police officer does everything reasonably within his power to
limit the secondary search to only what the private party previously viewed.
This could be accomplished, for example, by telling the private party, “show me
what you saw.” The scope of the secondary search would thus be in the hands
of the private party, albeit at the direction of the government.
The courts would therefore be tasked with relying on the actions and accounts
of the private citizen in determining the reasonableness of police conduct. The
narrow “single file” view makes this an arduous fact-finding exercise by the
court to determine whether the private citizen can recall if the files shown to the
police officer were the exact files searched during the initial private search.192
This becomes patently more onerous when hundreds or thousands of files exist
across many different subfolders. 193 Under this view, if the private citizen
cannot recall which images she viewed during the initial search, the secondary
search by the private citizen under the direction of the police would be
Jacobsen’s ambit entirely. . . . And agency is relevant to an after-occurring search analysis where
the court determines that the after-occurring search exceeds the scope of the initial private search.”).
188. Id. at 485.
189. United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 872 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v.
Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir. 1985)).
190. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 485.
191. Kerr, supra note 173.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 481.
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impermissible despite the fact that the police officer arguably took all reasonable
steps to limit the secondary search to only those items in which the expectation
of privacy had already been frustrated.194
2. Agency Theory and the Broad View
Assuming the search occurs within the same physical device (i.e., a single
computer), the broad view avoids the aforementioned problem entirely. 195
When the privacy interest in the entire device has been frustrated, there is no
need to untangle the particular facts to determine whether the police search was
limited to only the files that the private party initially searched; rather, the courts
adopting this view have stated that the privacy interest in the entire device has
already been frustrated once the private party views at least one file in that
device.196 As such, whether the private party searched more files during the
secondary search to assist police than she did during her initial search is not
dispositive.197 The only relevant agency issue that must be resolved under the
broad view is whether the government directed the initial search by the private
party—a much simpler fact-finding exercise than the exercise required by the
narrow approach.198
III. THE BROAD VIEW BEST CAPTURES THE SPIRIT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
A. Practical Considerations of the Broad View
The split created by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits on the one hand, and the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits on the other, calls for a resolution by the Supreme
Court in the near future. As technology continues to develop and become an
integral part of our daily lives, police and courts must have clear direction to
avoid actions that violate the Constitution.199
Should the Supreme Court be faced with such an opportunity, it should uphold
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ decisions and establish the rule that a warrantless
police search of a container or data file not previously searched by a private party
implicates the Fourth Amendment unless the police can be substantially certain
of the item’s contents based on information, knowledge, and expertise. 200
194. See id. at 487–88.
195. See Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Runyan, 275
F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001).
196. See Rann, 689 F.3d at 838.
197. See id.
198. Adams, supra note 10, at 2 (“[There are] two critical factors in making a determination as
to whether an individual was acting as a government agent: (1) whether the government knew of
and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the private actor’s purpose was to assist
law enforcement rather than to further his own ends.”); see also supra Section II.B.1.
199. See, e.g., Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465.
200. Id. at 463.
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Accordingly, warrantless police searches of more data files within the same
device than were searched by the previous private party should fall under the
protection of the private search doctrine and thus, should not implicate the
Fourth Amendment.201
The first part of this rule is in accord with the Fourth Amendment because it
preserves a person’s expectation of privacy in an item unopened by a private
searcher “unless the defendant’s expectation of privacy in the contents of the
[item] has already been frustrated because the contents were rendered obvious
by the private search.”202 Moreover, the second part of this rule, allowing a more
thorough police search than that of the private party, is consistent “with the
objectives underlying the warrant requirement and the exclusionary rule.”203
B. The Problems Associated with the Narrow View Illustrate the Broad View’s
Superiority.
Under the narrow “single file” approach, police would exceed the scope of the
prior private search, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, whenever they
happened to find an item that the private party did not.204 This would lead police
to be reluctant when conducting a subsequent search for fear that they will
discover important evidence that will be subject to suppression simply because
the private searcher did not happen to discover that evidence during his or her
initial search.205
The Runyan court explained the pernicious effect this would have on police
conduct: “[This] approach would over-deter the police, preventing them from
engaging in lawful investigation of containers where any reasonable expectation
of privacy has already been eroded.” 206 Further, police would expend

[U]nder Jacobsen, confirmation of prior knowledge does not constitute exceeding the
scope of a private search. In the context of a search involving a number of closed
containers, this suggests that opening a container that was not opened by private searchers
would not necessarily be problematic if the police knew with substantial certainty, based
on the statements of the private searchers, their replication of the private search, and their
expertise, what they would find inside.
Id.
201. See id. at 464; Rann, 689 F.3d at 838; United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610 (11th
Cir. 1990).
202. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464.
Moreover, this rule discourages police from going on ‘fishing expeditions’ by opening
closed containers. Any evidence that police obtain from a closed container that was
unopened by prior private searchers will be suppressed unless they can demonstrate to
a reviewing court that an exception to the exclusionary rule is warranted because they
were substantially certain of the contents of the container before they opened it.
Id.
203. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.; see, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772–73 (1983)
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unnecessary time obtaining warrants because confirming the private citizen’s
testimony regarding the initial search would subject police to a potential Fourth
Amendment violation should they accidentally stumble upon evidence that the
private searcher did not view.207
In contrast, the broad view makes clear to police that they do not offend the
Fourth Amendment if they conduct a more thorough search of the container than
the private searcher, so long as they can confirm that the private searcher viewed
at least one item in that container.208 It is for these reasons that the broad view
is the more sensible approach.
C. Police Conduct and Reasonableness
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the focal point of Fourth
Amendment analysis is the reasonableness of the government conduct.209 One
need not look any further than the factual underpinnings of the Sixth Circuit
decision in Lichtenberger to see how the narrow view obscures the definition of
reasonableness in the context of police searches.210 In Lichtenberger, the private
(holding that any standard must be (1) workable for application by trained police officers, (2)
reasonable, and (3) objective, rather than dependent on the belief of individual police officers).
207. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465. For a discussion of the warrant issue as it relates to the search
for contraband on computers, see Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer
Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and A Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 198–99 (2005).
208. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464; Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2012).
209. See e.g., Heien v. N. Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (finding a police officer’s
mistake of law justified under the Fourth Amendment because it was reasonable); Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”);
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) (analyzing the reasonableness of police conduct
and determining that “[w]hat [a defendant] is assured by the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that no
government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur
that is ‘unreasonable’”); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (determining that the issue
of whether police used excessive force must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the
Fourth Amendment); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987) (holding that despite police
officers’ mistake of fact, their actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment because they were
reasonable); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (“[T]he central inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion
of a citizen’s personal security.”); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (focusing
on the reasonableness of police action); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158–59 (1925)
(finding that the validity of a search turns on the police officer’s reasonableness). Reasonableness
is
[T]he fundamental command of the [Fourth] Amendment and this imprecise and
flexible term reflects the framers’ recognition that searches and seizures were too
valuable to law enforcement to prohibit them entirely but that they should be slowed
down. Reasonableness is the measure of both the permissibility of the initial decision
to search and seize and the permissible scope of those intrusions.
Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977,
977 (2004); see Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 197, 198 (1993) (“According to the Court, the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment
is ‘reasonableness.’”).
210. See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 480–81 (6th Cir. 2015).
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citizen viewed approximately one hundred photographs on the laptop during the
initial private search.211 When the police officer arrived, he requested the private
citizen show him what she had found.212 The citizen began clicking on random
thumbnail images, showing the officer approximately four to five images in
total. 213 Upon recognizing the images as child pornography, the officer
immediately instructed the private citizen to shut down the laptop.214 The court
ruled that the subsequent warrantless search by the police officer violated the
Fourth Amendment because the private citizen could not be certain that the four
to five images she showed the officer were among the same images she initially
searched on her own.215
It is difficult to see, however, the unreasonableness of the police action in this
instance. The officer, upon being informed that the laptop contained several
contraband images, and seemingly in an effort to confirm the testimony by the
private citizen to obtain probable cause for a warrant, instructed the private
citizen to show him what she had found.216 In so doing, it can be inferred that
the officer likely assumed that any expectation of privacy had been extinguished
by the private search.217 The officer viewed only four to five of the one hundred
photographs previously searched and requested the laptop be shut down
immediately after confirming the private citizen’s testimony of the existence of
contraband.218
Confirming a private citizen’s testimony of the presence of illegal contraband
in order to obtain a warrant, especially when severely limited in scope as
compared to the initial search, is hardly unreasonable government conduct. The
narrow view provides Fourth Amendment protection for each individual file that
the private party did not search, but this view greatly inhibits seemingly
reasonable police conduct.219 When a private searcher cannot be certain whether
the images shown to police are among the same images viewed during the initial
private search, otherwise reasonable police conduct would be held unreasonable,
therefore upsetting the traditional understanding of reasonableness that has
historically been the touchstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.220 The
narrow view adds a virtual certainty requirement that is wholly unfamiliar to the

211. Id. at 481.
212. Id. at 480.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 489 (“All the photographs [the private citizen] showed [the officer] contained
images of child pornography, but there was no virtual certainty that would be the case. The same
folders could have contained, . . . for example, explicit photos of Lichtenberger himself: legal,
unrelated to the crime alleged, and the most private sort of images.”).
216. Id. at 480.
217. See discussion supra Section I.C.
218. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 480–81.
219. See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
220. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.

2016]

Private Search: A Broad or Narrow Exception?

473

Fourth Amendment.221 The aforementioned factual quandary created by this
demanding standard may very well signal the death of the private search
doctrine. The broad view, contrastingly, upholds the historically-understood
definition of reasonableness, permitting the police conduct described above
when it can be proved that the private citizen searched at least one of the images
on the laptop computer.222
IV. CONCLUSION
The rapid growth of technology presents courts with challenging new legal
questions due to the amount of information that many of these devices are
capable of storing.223 These developments make it ever more important that
police and citizens alike understand the privacy protections offered by the Fourth
Amendment. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have weighed in
on this issue and reached different conclusions regarding the proper scope of a
police search that follows on the heels of a private-party search. To resolve this
conflict, the Supreme Court should adopt the broad view, which states that the
police may constitutionally search an entire device when a private party has
previously searched any part of that device. As illustrated by the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits, this view most accurately captures the spirit of the private
search doctrine and the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.

221. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
222. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
223. See supra notes 48, 51 and accompanying text.
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